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It is to be hoped that these indications are true ones and that the
North Carolina Supreme Court will, in fact, persist in its refusal to
follow the federal example.
ROBERT PERRY, JR.
Federal Jurisdiction-Diversity of Citizenship-Realignment
of Parties in Corporate Derivative Suits
A New York stockholder in a New York corporation brought a
derivative suit against a citizen of Kentucky. The corporation was
joined as a defendant in accordance with the practice in derivative suits.
The complaint alleged that the officers in control of the New York Cor-
poration had wrongfully transferred shares to the Kentucky defendant
in exchange for some worthless property. The Kentucky defendant
sought dismissal for lack of diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff
stockholder, a citizen of New York, and his New York corporation.
The plaintiff conceded the apparent absence of diversity but contended
that the court should sustain diversity jurisdiction by realigning the
New York corporation as a complainant, since the action was on behalf
of that corporation.
. The court ref used to realign on the ground that the complaint showed
that managing powers of the New York .corporation had fradulently
conspired with the other defendant, therefore the corporation was a
rightful and necessary party defendant and could not be regarded
otherwise.'
The problem of realignment is of particular significance in corporate
derivative suits, in view of the facts that jurisdiction in such cases is
usually based on diversity of citizenship, 2 the right sought to be en-
forced is a corporate right,3 and the corporation is an indispensable
party.4 Logically, it would seem that the corporation should be aligned
1 Smallen v. Louisville Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 80 F. Supp. 279 (W. D. Ky.
1948).
' See Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S. 518,
522 (1947) ("With possible rare exceptions, these actions involve only issues of
state law and . . . can get into federal courts only by reason of diversity of
citizenship of the parties.").
* Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., supra note 2 at 522
("The cause of action which such a plaintiff brings before the court is not his
own but the corporations's.") ; Greenberg v. Giannini, 140 F. 2d 550, 554 (C. C. A.
2d 1944); STEVENS, CORPORATIONS §163 (1936) ("the mere fact that the share-
holder appears as plaintiff ... does not change the substantial nature of the right
to be enforced or the judgment to be collected. Both the right and the judgment
belong to the ... corporation.").
'Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall. 626 (U. S. 1873); Hobbs v. Mitchell, 80 F.
2d 172 (C. C. A. 10th 1935) (held that it was collusive to leave out the corpora-




as a complainant for purposes of testing diversity, 5 but the cases have
not followed that course.
One of the earliest federal decisions recognizing a stockholder's suit
to enforce a corporate right was Dodge v. Woolsey6 in which the Su-
preme Court affirmed the grant of injunctive relief to a Connecticut stock-
holder in his suit to prevent Ohio taxing officials from collecting a tax
from the Ohio corporation. Clearly there would have been no diversity
if the corporation had brought the suit. The taxing officials labeled the
case a contrivance to give jurisdiction, but the Supreme Court held that
the right of a citizen of Connecticut to sue a citizen of Ohio in federal
court could not be questioned.
The Dodge case was decided before the federal courts had statutory
authority to dismiss for collusion in manufacturing diversity of citizen-
ship by getting a non-resident stockholder to bring a derivative suit, and
before the doctrine of realignment was recognized. It was not until
1880 that the Supreme Court abandoned the practice of testing diversity
by means of the position of the parties in the pleadings and construed
the Judiciary Act of March 3, 1875, 7 as empowering the federal courts
to realign the parties.8 Since that time it has become well settled that,
for purposes of testing the jurisdiction of a federal court on the basis
of diversity of citizenship, it is immaterial how the parties are arranged
in the pleadings. It is the duty of the court to align them according to
their real interest in the controversy ;9 that is, on the basis of their actual
legal interests and the apparent result to them if the object sought is
successful.10
Doctor v. HarringtonI" is probably the leading Supreme Court de-
cision on the issue of realignment in stockholders' derivative suits. In
that case, as in the Dodge case, there would not have been the necessary
complete diversity if the corporation had been realigned. The court
recognized that the right was one which could properly be asserted by the
corporation but concluded that since "the corporation is controlled by
interests antagonistic to complainant12 . . . the defendant corporation is
not to be classed on the same side of the controversy as complainant
1 STREET, FEDERAL EQUITY PRACTICE 562 (1909) ("In as much as these suits
are always technically based on a right of action primarily vested in the corpora-
tion itself, it has been suggested that . . . the corporation ought always to be
treated as being in the same right with the actual plaintiff stockholder.").
18 How. 331 (U. S. 1856).
18 STAT. 470 (1875). See Pub. L. No. 773, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. §§1332,
1441, 1447 (June 25, 1948).
' Removal Cases, 100 U. S. 457 (1879); Pacific Railroad v. Ketchum, 101
U. S. 289 (1880).
'Indianapolis v. Chase Nat. Bank, 314 U. S. 63 (1941); Thomson v. Butler,
136 F. 2d 644 (C. C. A. 8th 1943), cert. denied, 320 U. S. 761 (1943).1 See Thomson v. Butler, supra note 9 at 647. "
11196 U. S. 579 (1905).
Italics supplied.
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stockholder for the purpose of determining the diversity of citizenship
on which the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court must rest."
Inconsistent language used in some of the subsequent decisions cer-
tainly justifies an observation that the cases are conflicting, particularly
if an attempt is made to state the rule applied in terms of the results
reached. 13  However, the decisions have substantially adhered to the
reasoning and the theory of Doctor v. Harrington.14  As in that case,
the federal courts have frequently refused to realign the corporate de-
fendant to defeat'5 diversity jurisdiction, while in others, like the instant
case, the courts have refused to realign the corporate defendant to sus-
tain'6 diversity jurisdiction. There have also been cases in which the
court did realign to defeat diversity,' 7 and in one case the corporate
defendant was realigned to sustain diversity jurisdiction, when its answer
in effect joined in the complaint1s However, the cases are in agree-
ment in that the presence or absence of an antagonistic attitude in the
persons controlling the corporation determined the question of realign-
ment in each case.
"
3See BREWSTER, FEDERAL PROCEDURE §382 (1940) ("The decisions on this
point are in sharp conflict, some holding that defendant shall be deemed for all
jurisdictional purposes a real party plaintiff, and others refusing to conform to
this doctrine. . . ."); MONTGOMERY, MANUAL OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PRO-
CEDURE §67 (4th ed. 1942) ("the rule [of realignment] is not applied in the case
of stockholder's bills-for, otherwise, it would be impossible for a non-resident
stockholder to bring suit in the federal court. This being the situation, the cor-
poration will not be realigned. . . .") ; 2 MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE §23.21 (2d ed.
1948) ("The majority of the federal courts have refused to do this [realign],
when to do so would defeat their jurisdiction."). But see RosE, JURISDICTION
AND PROCEDURE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS §338 (2d ed. 1922) ; 1 STREET, FEDERAL
EQUITY PRACTICE §562 (1909).
" E.g., Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S.
518 (1947) ; Venner v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 209 U. S. 24 (1908) ; Hutchinson
Box Board & Paper Co. v. Van Horn, 299 Fed. 424 (C. C. A. 8th 1924) ; Laughner
v. Schell, 260 Fed. 396 (C. C. A. 3d 1919); Cutting v. Woodward, 255 Fed. 633
(C. C. A. 9th 1918) ; Lindauer v. Compania Palomas, 247 Fed. 428 (C. C. A. 8th
1918), cert. denied, 246 U. S. 670 (1918); Hyams v. Calumet & Hecla Mining
Co., 221 Fed. 529 (C. C. A. 6th 1915); Ashley v. Keith Oil Co., 73 F. Supp. 37
(D. Mass. 1947); Richardson v. Blue Grass Mining Co., 29 F. Supp. 658 (E. D.
Ky. 1939), af'd, 127 F. 2d 291 (C. C. A. 6th 1942), cert. denied, 317 U. S. 639
(1942); Nagle v. Wyoga Gas & Oil Corp., 10 F. Supp. 905 (M. D. Pa. 1935);
Harris v. Brown, 6 F. 2d 922 (W. D. Ky. 1925) ; Whitaker v. Whitaker Iron Co.,
238 Fed. 980 (N. D. W. Va. 1916), aff'd, 249 Fed. 531 (C. C. A. 4th 1917), cert.
denied, 248 U. S. 564 (1918) ; Baillie v. Backus, 230 Fed. 711 (D. Or. 1916) ; Craw-
ford v. Seattle R. & S. Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 920 (W. D. Wash. 1912); Howard v.
Nat. Tel. Co., 182 Fed. 215 (C. C. N. D. W. Va. 1910) ; Kelly v. Miss. River Coal-
ing Co., 175 Fed. 482 (C. C. W. D. Pa. 1909); Gage v. Riverside Trust Co., 156
Fed. 1002 (C. C. S. D. Cal. 1906) ; Lucas v. Milliken, 139 Fed. 816 (C. C. D. S. C.
1905).
" Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty' Co., 330 U. S. 518
(1947); Venner v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 209 U. S. 24 (1908).
" Nagle v. Wyoga Gas & Oil Corp., 10 F. Supp. 905 (M. D. Pa. 1935);
Crawford v. Seattle R. & S. Ry. Co., 198 Fed. 920 (W. D. Wash. 1912).
"* Laughner v. Schell, 260 Fed. 396 (C. C. A. 3d 1919) ; Gage v. Riverside Trust
Co., 156 Fed. 1002 (C. C. S. D. Cal. 1906) ; accord, Lindauer v. Compania Palomas,
247 Fed. 428 (C. C. A. 8th 1918).
" Lucas v. Milliken, 139 Fed. 816 (C. C. D. S. C. 1905).
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NOTES AND COMMENTS
The practice of collusively obtaining federal diversity jurisdiction
by means of the corporate derivative suit, which developed soon after
the decision in the Dodge case, led the Supreme Court, in Hawes v.
Oakland,'0 to restrict the doctrine of the Dodge case by placing the bur-
den on the plaintiff stockholder to show that he had a proper case for
a derivative suit and that there was no collusion with the corporation to
manufacture federal diversity jurisdiction.20 The doctrine of that case
was subsequently codified 2' and now is substantially embodied in fed-
eral rule 23 (b) 22
The purpose of the requirements set out in rule 23 (b) was to de-
termine the question of the authority of the plaintiff to maintain a
derivative suit and not to raise questions of realignment and diversity
jurisdiction,23 but compliance with 23 (b) indirectly affects these ques-
tions by showing that the persons in control of the corporation are
antagonistic to the stockholder's interests.24 By the application of gen-
eral equitable principles, upon which rule 23 (b) is based, a stockholder
has no authority to institute a derivative suit unless the persons in con-
trol of the corporation have wrongfully refused to bring the suit.25
Thus, whenever a stockholder has the proper standing to bring a de-
rivative suit, the corporation is controlled by interests antagonistic to
the stockholder, and the federal court will not realign the corporate
defendant either to sustain or defeat diversity jurisdiction. 26 Of course,
2- 104 U. S. 450 (1882).
" Hawes v. Oakland, supra note 19 at 461, 462.2 Equity Rule 94, 104 U. S. IX (1882).
22 FED. R. Civ. P., 23(b) (In a derivative suit, the complaint must aver "that
the action is not a collusive one to confer on a court of the United States juris-
diction of any action of which it would not otherwise have jurisdiction. The
complaint shall also set forth with particularity the efforts of the plaintiff to
secure from the managing directors or trustees and, if necessary, from the share-
holders such action as he desires, and the reasons for his failire to obtain such
action or the reasons for not making such effort.").
22 See Venner v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 209 U. S. 24, 34 (1908) ; 13 CycLo-
iPEDIA OF FEDERAL PROCEDURE §6876 (2d ed. 1944).
"Gage v. Riverside Trust Co., 156 Fed. 1002, 1007 (C. C. S. D. Cal. 1906)
(". .. the failure to comply with equity rule 94 not only affects the merits, but
determines the proper alignment of the parties and thus indirectly goes to the
question of federal jurisdiction."); Groel v. United Electric Co., 132 Fed. 252
(C. C. D. N. 1. 1904).2' STEVENS, CORPORATI o S §162 (1936) ("The minority shareholder has no
standing to institute an action in the right of the corporate group, overriding a
decision honestly arrived at by the directors or majority stockholders"). When
the persons controlling the corporation are shown to be antagonistic to the stock-
holder's interests, and yet rule 23(b) has not been complied with, the court will
not realign. Though such action may sustain diversity jurisdiction, the complaint
is subject to demurrer for failure to show a right in equity to sue. Venner v.
Great Northern Ry. Co., 153 Fed. 408 (C. C. S. D. N. Y. 1907), aff'd, 209 U. S. 24
(1908).
2" When the court refuses to realign the corporation, it would seem that diver-
sity jurisdiction would always be defeated by the conclusive presumption that a
corporation is composed of citizens of the state of incorporation. Marshall v.
Baltimore & Ohio R. R., 16 How. 314 (U. S. 1853). That possibility was re-
1949]
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if the corporation is not controlled by antagonistic interests, the corpora-
tion may be realigned to sustain or defeat diversity jurisdiction,27 but
even if jurisdiction is sustained by the realignment, the stockholder has
no standing to maintain the suit.
The courts have sought to bring the rule applied in derivative suits
within the doctrine of realignment by stating it in terms of the antag-
onistic control of the corporation; however, the ultimate result amounts
to a variation in the realignment doctrine which not only violates the
basic theory of derivative suits28 but cannot be reconciled with the prac-
tice of treating the corporation as a plaintiff for other jurisdictional
purposes2 and for the purpose of determining the district in which the
suit may be brought.30
LIVINGSTON VERNON.
Labor Law-Unfair Labor Practice-Discriminatory Denial of
Use of Company Hall for Union Organization
An employer, motivated by anti-union bias, refused to allow union
organizers to hold a meeting of employees in an employer-owned hall,
not connected with the plant, in a North Carolina mill village. The hall
had been used for other community activities in the past without objec-
tion. The only other public buildings in the mill village were also owned
or controlled by the employer and unavailable to the organizers. Be-
cause of these circumstances the National Labor Relations Board found
that the employer had discriminated against the union in violation of
Section 8(1) of the National Labor Relations Act,1 and ordered that
jected in Doctor v. Harrington, 196 U. S. 579 (1905), when Justice McKenna
explained that the fiction was created to give federal courts diversity jurisdiction
over corporations and could not be extended. See generally McGovney, A Su-
preme Court Fiction, Corporations in the Diverse Citizenship Jurisdiction of the
Federal Courts, 56 HARv. L. REV. 853 (1943).
27 Laughner v. Schell, 260 Fed. 396 (C. C. A. 3d 1919) (Requirements of rule
23(b) were not complied with. The court realigned to defeat jurisdiction and
dismissed the bill for failure to comply with th6 rule.).
2" See note 3 supra.
"See Koster v. (American) Lumbermens Mutual Casualty Co., 330 U. S.
518, 523 (1947) ; Hutchinson Box Board & Paper Co. v. Van Horn, 299 Fed. 424,
428 (C. C. A. 8th 1924) ("The amount in controversy is the value of the cor-
porate right sought to be enforced and not the value of . . . [stockholder's]
interest.").3028 U. S. C. §1401 (Supp. 1948) ("Any civil action by a stockholder on
behalf of his corporation may be prosecuted in any judicial district where the
corporation might have sued the same defendents.").
149 STAT. 452 (1935), 29 U. S. C. §158(1) (1946), subsequently amended by
National Labor Management Relations Act, 61 STAT. -, 29 U. S. C. §158(a) (1)(Supp. 1947) : "It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer-(1) to inter-
fere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
in Section 7." Section 7 provides, "Employees shall have the right to self organ-
ization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and
[Vol. 27
